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Abstract
Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, pub-
lic goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This
article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public
goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard
second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Opti-
mal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility
from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the so-
cial welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change.
The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.
KEYWORDS: heterogeneous preferences, optimal income taxation, commodity taxation, exter-
nalities, public goods, social welfare
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Most analytical work in public economics that derives rules for optimal policy
assumes that preferences are homogeneous.  This characterization applies, for
example, to most of the literature on optimal income taxation, commodity taxation,
public goods provision, and the control of externalities.  The reason for this
simplification is tractability; indeed, the second-best problems are complex even
when preferences are stipulated to be homogeneous.
It is natural to explore whether and how standard results are modified when
preferences are heterogeneous.  Individuals may have ordinary differences in tastes:
Some may prefer chocolate, others vanilla; some may love nature and thus highly
value improvements to national parks or pollution regulations that restore wilderness
habitats, whereas others may desire city life and accordingly prefer enhancements
to urban amenities.  Differences may also arise on account of physical and mental
disabilities.
These possibilities raise a number of questions.  Does Atkinson and Stiglitz’s
(1976) result on uniform commodity taxation survive the introduction of
heterogeneity, and, if not, how do the results change?  Is the Samuelson rule for
public goods altered, or the Pigouvian dictum that corrective taxes and subsidies
should equal the marginal harms and benefits (respectively) from externalities?
Likewise, how are standard first-order conditions for optimal income taxation
affected?  How do the answers to such questions depend on whether differences in
preferences are observable?  Finally, how do they depend on the manner in which
preferences differ?  In other words, in what respects is the problem of preference
heterogeneity itself a heterogeneous phenomenon?
A related, more focused set of questions may be directed at a particular set
of results in public economics.  Certain policy rules have been demonstrated to be
optimal because following them generates Pareto improvements, one consequence
of which is that the optimal rules are independent of the particular choice of social
welfare function (SWF).  This approach is featured in generalizations of Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) on commodity taxation, as well as in work on public goods and
on externalities.
1  Yet when preferences are heterogeneous, Pareto improvements are
highly unlikely.  Virtually any policy reform, no matter how desirable, is likely to
generate some losers because certain individuals have idiosyncratic preferences that
are better served by the inefficient status quo.  For example, even substantial
reductions of a highly damaging pollutant at minimal cost may disfavor some whose
bodies are insensitive to the pollutant and who especially enjoy polluting activities
1
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heterogeneity, we might instead ask whether policies offer a “quasi-Pareto”
improvement, by which he means a gain, on average, to individuals at every level of
income (thereby addressing standard distributive concerns).  Nevertheless, it is
appropriate to explore formally and systematically how, if at all, the derivations and
results in this literature need to be adjusted in light of preference heterogeneity.
This article undertakes a preliminary exploration of these questions.  Section
2 presents a model with a nonlinear income tax and commodity taxes where
individuals’ preferences for commodities are heterogeneous.  In section 3, the model
is analyzed for the case in which preference differences are observable.  This case
is of interest because it is more tractable and transparent, facilitates examination of
the case with unobservable heterogeneity, and has some elements of realism (for
example, certain physical disabilities, with associated differences in preferences, are
observable).  It is straightforward to show that the Atkinson-Stiglitz result
concerning the optimality of uniform commodity taxation and a variety of extensions
are preserved.  The reason is that, with observability, the nonlinear income tax can
be preference-type-specific, which makes it possible to conduct the analysis of
commodity taxation as if preferences were identical.
Accordingly, the bulk of the analysis in section 3 focuses on optimal income
taxation results, which do differ.  Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher,
the same, or lower for individuals with preferences that yield higher utility for a
given level of disposable income.  The character of the result depends on the nature
of preference differences and on the concavity of utility functions and of the SWF.
An implication is that some results in prior literature attributed to preference
heterogeneity are in fact a product of the choice to model heterogeneity in one
particular way; other choices would have yielded different, even opposite,
conclusions.
Section 4 considers the case in which preference differences are
unobservable.  It is demonstrated that uniform commodity taxation is no longer
desirable.  However, determinants of the direction and magnitude of deviations are
complex and subtle.  Differentials in commodity taxation tend to be optimal to the
extent that their effects are similar to those of the adjustments to the income tax that
would have been optimal if preference differences were observable.
Section 5 extends the results to policy rules for public goods and
externalities, for which many of the conclusions are analogous to those for
commodity taxation: When preference differences are observable, one continues to
obtain benchmark results of first-best policy rules, notably, the Samuelson rule for
public goods and the Pigouvian prescription for complete internalization of
externalities.  When preference differences are not observable, deviations depend on
some of the same sorts of factors as with commodity taxation and serve the same
2
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purpose of indirectly substituting for the redistributive adjustments to the income tax
that would have been optimal in the case of observability.
Section 6 briefly considers pertinent issues in welfare economics, namely,
concerning the concavity of the SWF and interpersonal comparisons of utility.  The
motivation is that many of the results concerning heterogeneity—including the signs
of the optimal adjustments as well as the magnitudes—depend on these aspects of
welfare aggregation.  Moreover, when preferences and thus commodity demands are
heterogeneous, it is no longer possible to address interpersonal comparisons by
simply treating everyone as if they had the same utility function.  Concluding
remarks are offered in section 7.
Prior work on heterogeneity is of a number of types.  Saez (2002) introduces
heterogeneity regarding previously established deviations from the Atkinson-Stiglitz
uniform commodity tax result: Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) had shown that relaxing
labor separability favors nonuniformity, and Mirrlees (1976) had shown that
relaxing the assumption that preferences are independent of earning ability favors
nonuniformity.  Saez (2002) demonstrates that, when these relationships are not
deterministic but rather reflect mere correlations, similar results obtain.
2  By contrast,
the present article abstracts from these two considerations and examines instead
effects of heterogeneity that pertain more directly to the marginal social value of
redistribution than to the labor-leisure distortion caused by income taxation.
Some discussion of these other sorts of heterogeneity appears in prior
literature—especially on public goods, e.g., Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Ng
(1984b), Boadway and Keen (1993), and Kaplow (1996)—but does not suggest or
demonstrate the results derived here.  Other papers have examined certain technical
aspects of the nonlinear income tax problem when additional dimensions are
introduced.  See Ebert (1988) and Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999), and also
Armstrong and Rochet (1999) on multidimensional screening more generally.
Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999) also present some simulations, but their example has
special features.  In addition, it is hard to interpret their simulation results regarding
differences in optimal redistribution in the presence of heterogeneity because the
means of the parameters in their two-dimensional case differ, often significantly,
from the values in their one-dimensional case.  Boadway et al. (2002) focus on which
self-selection constraints are binding in a model in which preferences are of two
types, and Cremer et al. (2001) discuss modifications to the Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) result when individuals differ in unobservable endowments.
Finally, some additional papers introduce specific forms of heterogeneity in
certain variations of the income or commodity tax problem.  Blackorby and
3
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feasible, differential taxation of medical care and other goods—may be optimal
when unobservable differences in medical needs exist.  Sandmo (1993) explores
some optimal income tax implications of heterogeneous tastes for work in a model
with no differences in earning abilities and only one type of consumption.
Marchand, Pestieau, and Racionero (2003) consider differences in the source of
disutility to labor that are unobservable, are relevant to social welfare under their
chosen nonwelfarist SWF, and are related differently to demands for particular
commodities.  Hellwig (2004) addresses optimal pricing by a public monopolist with
heterogenous consumers.  And Fleurbaey (2006) introduces preference heterogeneity
along with a nonwelfarist SWF that features a laissez-faire criterion that favors
noninterference with consumption choices.
As a whole, prior work does not address most of the questions examined here
or how the answers depend on observability or on the policy context—commodity
taxation, public goods, externalities, or pure income taxation.  Of particular note,
past inquiries, including those by this author, typically speak of heterogeneity as if
it were a unitary phenomenon when making general conjectures about how results
may change with heterogeneity or when examining particular models.  By contrast,
the present analysis allows preferences among commodities (or public goods or
external effects) to differ in various ways and finds that whether results change and,
when they do, in what direction depend on the nature of the heterogeneity that is
introduced.
2.  FRAMEWORK
2.1.  MODEL
The model has n commodities, indexed by i; a particular commodity is denoted xi.
Individuals choose labor effort, l, and commodity vectors, x, to maximize utility
u(x, l, 2), where 2 is a vector of preference parameters.  The consumer price vector
is q, taken to be the sum of fixed producer prices p and a commodity tax vector J.
Commodity taxes may be negative, i.e., subsidies.  The nonlinear income tax,
T(wl), is a function of individuals’ income, wl, the product of their unobservable
wage rate w and labor effort.  The budget constraint is
(.) ( ) . 21 qx wl T wl =−
The government chooses the commodity tax vector J—equivalently, the
consumer price vector q—and the nonlinear income tax T to maximize social
welfare, given by
4
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where  W is a weakly concave function, v is an individual’s indirect utility
function—indicating the maximized value of u for ability level w and preference
parameters 2 when the tax regime (J, T) is taken as given—and F is the cumulative
distribution function.  The government also faces a revenue constraint under which
commodity tax plus income tax revenue must meet a fixed target R, but this
requirement does not need to be examined explicitly here.
Much of the analysis focuses on the case in which the preference parameters
2 are observable.  Accordingly, the pertinent nonlinear income tax schedules are
T(wl, 2); that is, each preference type 2 faces a separate income tax schedule.  It is
assumed that commodity taxes, J, cannot be type-specific because of the possibility
of resale.  This restriction often does not matter (comments in footnote 5 discuss the
implications when it does).
Taking commodity taxes as given, the optimal nonlinear income tax is
characterized by a first-order condition derived, for example, in Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980), who make various simplifications, notably, that utility is separable between
consumption and labor effort, and offer other caveats that are not examined further
here.  Their condition can be expressed as:
(.)
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Primes denote derivatives with respect to income, that is, wl; vc is the marginal utility
of consumption; T is the variable of integration, indexing types with ability above
w; f is the density function derived from F; 8 is the marginal social value of a dollar
(i.e., the shadow price on the government’s revenue constraint); and g (implicitly a
function of w and 2) is related to the labor supply elasticity.  Note that expression
(2.3) suppresses the fact that indirect utility, v, depends on J, which is taken as given,
and on T.
The left side of expression (2.3) indicates the marginal income tax rate as a
fraction of the untaxed proportion of marginal earnings.  On the right side, the
denominator indicates the marginal distortionary cost of a higher marginal income
tax rate.  It is the product of three components:  g (as noted, a term related to the
labor supply elasticity); w, which measures the productivity lost by each unit
reduction in labor supply (and likewise indicates the marginal revenue loss); and
f(w, 2), which is the portion of the population that is distorted at the margin.
5
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income tax rates in terms of revenue raised on those earning more than wl, for whom
a marginal income tax rate increase at income wl is inframarginal.  This integral is
from the marginal type, w, who faces the marginal rate increase, to the upper limit
of the distribution of ability types, taken here to be unbounded.  The key term for
present purposes is that in the large parentheses in the integrand.  The numerator of
the latter component, WNvc, is the marginal contribution to social welfare caused by
a unit increase in utility of the pertinent type multiplied by that type’s marginal
utility of consumption—i.e., net-of-income-tax income or disposable income.  This
term is divided by 8, which converts units of social welfare into dollars.
Accordingly, as the overall marginal contribution of individuals’ consumption to
social welfare is greater (ceteris paribus), the term in parentheses is smaller, the
value of the integral is lower, and thus the optimal marginal tax rate is lower.
A significant caveat to this analysis is that this first-order condition (2.3)
characterizes optimal marginal tax rates but does not tell us the intercept of the
schedule, T(0), which typically is negative (a uniform grant).  Suppose, for example,
that all individuals in some group, 2, have a higher welfare weight.  This weight
tends to favor a lower intercept (a larger transfer), which tends to offset the just-
mentioned effect on optimal marginal tax rates.  Accordingly, the discussion that
follows usually refers, for example, to a factor favoring a lower level of income
taxation on a group, not disentangling the extent to which this result is optimally
effectuated through a lower intercept and lower marginal tax rates.
It is also important to keep in mind that, for the case in which 2 is observable,
the first-order condition is separately stated for each 2.  These separate conditions
are linked to the single social optimization problem by the common shadow price 8.
When comparing groups with different values of 2, those with higher marginal
social valuations of consumption should, ceteris paribus, be subject to lower levels
of income taxation.  This “ceteris paribus” statement is, however, highly problematic
because 2 affects other components in expression (2.3) as well.  (Notably, a given
ability type w with a different 2 may choose to supply a different level of labor
effort, l, and thus earn a different level of income, wl.)  Nevertheless, the standard
practice of interpreting this sort of first-order condition term by term provides some
valuable insight into this highly complicated problem.
The analysis here focuses on utility functions that are at least weakly
separable in labor.  Specifically, attention is confined to forms of u(x, l, 2) that can
be written as u(u
1(x, 2), l, 2).  This restriction is meaningful because x is a vector.
The weak separability assumption means that, in allocating resources among the xi’s,
it is immaterial how much labor effort, l, was required to produce the individual’s
level of disposable income.  Likewise, the allocation among the xi’s does not directly
influence the choice of labor effort, l; all that matters is the level of subutility,
u
1(x, 2), that is obtained.
6
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As suggested in the introduction, individuals’ preferences can vary in a number of
qualitatively different ways.  Before stating possibilities in terms of the functional
form of the utility function and analyzing them formally, it is useful to articulate
intuitively the sorts of heterogeneity that are examined.  Because heterogeneity may
well be good-specific, the discussion throughout is in terms of specific commodities
rather than utility as a whole.  Although some of the depictions may be somewhat
elusive due to the informality, each type of heterogeneity corresponds to specific
preference parameters that are introduced momentarily and then analyzed, thereby
eliminating any residual ambiguity.
First (corresponding to ", just below), individuals may vary in their
sensitivity to a good’s contribution to utility.  For example, two individuals may
enjoy ice cream and find that its consumption is subject to diminishing returns in the
same manner, but one may have a higher overall sensitivity; perhaps ice cream,
consumed at any given level, delivers twice as much utility to this individual.  The
individual with greater sensitivity is shown to have a higher marginal utility of
disposable income, ceteris paribus, as a result.
Second ($), individuals may differ in their ability to convert raw commodities
into utility.  The difference may be physical (one is able to make use of the product
with less waste), physiological, or psychological.  For example, individuals with a
greater body mass or rate of metabolism may convert calories to resulting states of
being at different rates.  Some readers may find this type of heterogeneity to be
similar to the first, but, as will be seen, it is importantly different, specifically in
terms of how this difference interacts with diminishing returns in consumption; see
the discussion of parameter D below.  As is demonstrated, those who are more
efficient converters of commodities into utility may have a higher or a lower
marginal utility of income, ceteris paribus, depending on this curvature parameter.
Third ((), individuals may in essence start their consumption at different
points along a utility curve.  For example, one may need eyeglasses or corrective
surgery to possess the same vision or other attribute that others come by naturally.
Individuals who are relatively blessed in this regard are shown to have a lower
marginal utility of income, ceteris paribus, because their situation is equivalent to
being endowed with greater initial income.
Fourth (*), some individuals’ utilities may have different base points.
Perhaps due to a different psychological constitution, some may achieve higher or
lower well-being for any given level of consumption.  Individuals better off in this
respect have a higher utility level but the same marginal utility of income as others
do, ceteris paribus.
7
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standard utility functions.  In a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, $ = 1, ( = 0,
* = 0, the "’s may sum to one and do not vary across individuals, D varies neither across commodities
nor individuals, and the entire summation is raised to the power 1/1!D, which is an immaterial
difference for present purposes.  Cobb-Douglas utility is equivalent to the special case described in
the text following expression (2.4) in which D = 1.  Finally, the parameter ( is suggestive of a Stone-
Geary utility function, where it is typical to take each (i to be negative (and to replace the summation
with a product) so that the (i represent subsistence levels of each commodity (in that, if such level is
not exceeded, total utility is zero regardless of the level of consumption of other commodities).
The present analysis distinguishes these types of heterogeneity because they
have qualitatively different effects on behavior and on optimal policies due to their
different effects on individuals’ marginal utility of income.  In order to understand
these distinctions among types of heterogeneity more concretely and to derive their
consequences, it is useful to explore a simple, specific utility function that embodies
all four types in a transparent fashion.  The functional form to be considered is a five-
parameter (by n) function.  Thus, let 2 = (", $, (, *, D), where each of these
parameters may take on a different value for each commodity.  (The fifth parameter,
D, is the curvature parameter noted in the discussion of $.)  This utility function is
3
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It is assumed that "i > 0, $i > 0, Di > 0 (each for all i), zN > 0, and zO > 0.  (For the
case in which the concavity parameter, Di, equals 1, the fractional expression is
replaced by ln ($ixi + (i); it will be apparent below that using this alternative yields
the same first-order conditions, so none of the analysis is affected.)  It is helpful for
most discussion to think of a base case in which, for any commodity xi, "i = $i = 1
and (i = *i = 0.  Relative to that case, a higher "i magnifies the contribution of xi to
utility without being subject to the curvature effect through Di; a higher $i magnifies
the contribution of xi to utility but is subject to the curvature effect through Di;
(i adds to utility in a manner that is subject to the curvature effect through Di; and *i
adds to utility without being subject to the curvature effect through Di.  (The *i’s are
interchangeable—only their summation matters—but this notation is employed to
maintain symmetry.)  It is obvious that raising any of these four parameters raises
utility; however, as will be explored, they have a qualitatively different effect on
marginal utility and thus may have a different effect on optimal policies.
8
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3.1.  OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION
For the case in which individuals’ preference parameters are observable, the
existence of any of these types of preference heterogeneity has no significant impact
on results concerning optimal commodity taxation in the presence of a nonlinear
income tax.  Specifically, weak separability of labor is sufficient to generate the
result that no differentiation is optimal, which implies that optimal commodity taxes
may be taken to be zero.  This result does not require that the income tax be optimal,
and it can be extended to show the optimality of various partial commodity tax
reforms, such as moving differentiated commodity taxes proportionally toward
uniformity.
Upon reflection, this conclusion should not be surprising.  The reason that
results in the homogeneous case carry over in the presence of heterogeneity when
preference differences are observable is that, as is now elaborated, one can
decompose the latter problem into a number of cases of the former.  Furthermore,
because the proof technique that is employed in certain papers in the relevant
literature does not depend on the optimality of the income tax (which is affected by
heterogeneity) or on any global properties of the system, the fact that these features
may change in the presence of preference heterogeneity does not affect the results
regarding optimal commodity taxation.
To see that this is indeed the case, begin by observing that the proof of all of
the results on commodity taxation—including that no differentiation is optimal and
that partial reforms moving proportionately toward neutrality are desirable—in
Kaplow (2006a) and in some other work, e.g., Laroque (2005), requires only weak
separability of labor and that the subutility function of commodities, u
1 in the above
formulation, be common.  Regarding the latter, when preference parameters are
observable, the problem can be analyzed as if preferences are identical because the
nonlinear income tax can be preference-type-specific.
Rather than reconstructing the pertinent proofs, it should be sufficient to
review their two key steps.  The first step—the one that depends on homogeneous
preferences—involves constructing an adjustment to the preexisting nonlinear
income tax so that, when combined with the commodity tax reform—say, a move
toward uniformity—everyone’s utility is held constant.  Specifically, this
intermediate tax schedule, T°(wl), is defined such that V(J, T, wl) = V(J*, T°, wl)
for all wl—where V is an indirect subutility function indicating the maximized value
of what is here denoted u
1.  For this construction to be feasible—i.e., for the same tax
schedule to preserve subutility for all individuals—it is necessary that the underlying
9
Kaplow: Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 20084For further discussion, consider Boadway and Keen’s (1993) examination of preference
heterogeneity in the public goods context (in an analysis that employs first-order conditions for social
welfare maximization rather than constructing Pareto improvements).
5Note that the requirement that commodity taxes be anonymous (i.e., not type-specific) is not
restrictive because all types should face the same (zero) tax vector.  If one relaxed the labor
separability assumption, however, the optimal commodity tax problem would be complicated by the
fact that the optimal differentiation, which reflects the degree to which various commodities are
complements to or substitutes for labor, could depend on individuals’ specific preferences.  (Suppose,
for example, that xi was a complement and xj was a substitute for type 21 but the opposite was true for
type 22.)  Ideally, each type would be subject to distinctive commodity taxes and subsidies, but if this
is infeasible the optimum would roughly reflect a weighted average of what would be optimal for
different types considered separately.  When the optimum for each type is the same, which is true with
separability, this complication does not arise.
subutility functions be identical (but homogeneity in other respects is not required).
4
Here, u
1 depends on 2.  However, when 2 is observable, a separate income tax
schedule is applied for each 2; hence, a separate income tax adjustment may be
employed as well.  Thus, for each 2, one can define T°(wl, 2) as the adjustment to
T(wl, 2) such that V(J, T, wl, 2) = V(J*, T°, wl, 2) for all wl.
At this point, the remainder of the proofs in Kaplow (2006a) and in other
pertinent papers goes through.  In particular, it was shown there that this tax
adjustment, which holds utility constant for each level of labor supply, does in fact
induce individuals to choose the same level of labor supply as they did initially.  The
reasoning is, in essence, that the tax adjustment, when combined with the
contemplated commodity tax adjustment, produces the same mapping from l to total
utility as was produced initially, so whatever l maximized utility initially continues
to do so after the reform.
To complete the proofs, it was demonstrated that commodity tax reforms that
are efficient in the narrow, conventional sense—including moves toward
uniformity—produce a revenue surplus.  The intuition is that, since the income tax
adjustment holds utility constant, yet efficiency rises, the income tax adjustment
must be absorbing a dollar amount that is equivalent to the underlying efficiency
gain.  The resulting surplus, in turn, can be rebated pro rata, generating a Pareto
improvement.
5
3.2.  OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION
With observable differences in preferences, it is optimal to employ different
nonlinear income tax schedules.  In this case, commodity taxes can be put to the side;
specifically, they are taken to be zero.  The focus is on how the marginal social
contribution of disposable income to social welfare, WNvc, depends on 2 when
10
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http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/iss1/art406The idea of analyzing policies’ effects on different individuals by focusing on the marginal
contribution to social welfare of a dollar distributed to different types of individuals is associated with
Diamond (1975).  Note further that the analysis articulated in the text is incomplete because of other
aspects of the social first-order condition for optimal marginal income tax rates (2.3) that may differ,
other standard caveats in interpreting first-order conditions to make conjectures about the optimum,
and difficulties of comparing optimal income tax schedules across groups because individuals of a
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preferences have the form given by expression (2.4).
6  As already noted, it is obvious
that utility levels rise with ", $, (, and *.  To confirm this, note that the partial
derivative of u is clearly positive for each of these parameters, and the total
derivative has the same value (the envelope theorem).  If the SWF is utilitarian,
which means that WN is constant, this feature is of no consequence.  If instead the
SWF is strictly concave, i.e., WO < 0, then a group with a higher value of any of the
parameters should, ceteris paribus, face higher levels of income taxation because the
marginal contribution of their utility to social welfare is lower on account of their
already being better off.
Next, consider how raising any of these four parameters affects the marginal
utility of consumption, vc, which is relevant to the marginal social welfare gain from
additional disposable income regardless of the concavity of W (short of maximin,
wherein the welfare weight on everyone but the least-well-off individual is zero).
The key concept here is that a parameter that is associated with a higher marginal
utility of consumption calls for lower levels of taxation.  As mentioned in subsection
2.1, such lower taxation might be reflected in a more generous grant at zero income
or in lower marginal tax rates.
Effects on marginal utility from the different types of heterogeneity are, as
suggested in subsection 2.2, quite varied.  To analyze them, begin with individuals’
first-order conditions.  When expression (2.4) is maximized subject to the budget
constraint), we have, for each xi,
(.) ( ) , 31 αβ β γ μ
ρ
ii ii i i xq
i +=
−
where : is the marginal utility of disposable income (the shadow price on the budget
constraint).  This : is also equal to vc, employing the notation of the indirect utility
function from expressions (2.2) and (2.3).  It is useful to restate these conditions as
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Expression (3.2) indicates how each of the xi’s is a function of the preference
parameters for the corresponding good, the good’s consumer price, which is taken
here to be constant, and the marginal utility of consumption, :.  The first-order
condition for labor effort is
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The task is to determine how : changes with each of the preference
parameters.  It is convenient to let a generic preference parameter (aside from D) for
good k be denoted Nk.  Differentiating the budget constraint (2.1) with respect to Nk
yields
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Rearranging terms allows us to state
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To determine the sign of expression (3.5), begin with the denominator.
Differentiating the first-order condition for labor effort, l, expression (3.3), with
respect to :, and rearranging terms, produces
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according to the second-order condition for the choice of l (the denominator is the
negative of the second derivative of the individual’s Lagrangian with respect to l).
Differentiating expression (3.2) with respect to : yields
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Expressions (3.6) and (3.7) together imply that the denominator of expression (3.5)
is positive.  Accordingly, the sign of d:/dNk is the same as the sign of Mxk/MNk.
This result can be explained as follows.  Suppose, for example, that
Mxk/MNk > 0.  In this case, the direct effect of raising Nk is to induce the individual to
purchase more of xk, which through the budget constraint requires some combination
of reductions in expenditures on the other xi’s (i … k) and an increase in l, both of
which imply a higher :, which is apparent from expressions (3.2) and (3.3).
To sign the d:/dNk’s, therefore, all that remains is to sign the Mxk/MNk’s,
which is straightforward from expression (3.2).
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Expression (3.8) implies that M:/M"i > 0.  Because vc = :, it follows that the
overall effect on the social marginal value of consumption, WNvc, of raising "i is
ambiguous: utility rises, so WN falls if W is strictly concave; however, marginal
utility rises, so vc rises.  Those with a higher "i get more out of consuming xi, which
has these two competing effects.
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this is not the case.  Examination of expression (3.9) reveals that the sign of M:/M$i
is ambiguous.  For convenience, interpretation is confined to the benchmark case in
which (i = 0.  (When this is not so, the critical value of Di for which the sign of the
expression reverses would be adjusted accordingly.)  If Di < 1, then M:/M$i > 0, and
the results are indeed like those in the prior case.  However, if Di > 1, then M:/M$i < 0,
and the marginal utility effect combines with the effect on WN to reduce the social
marginal valuation of consumption.  The difference arises because the $i coefficient
in expression (2.4) directly multiplies xi and thus is subject to the concavity of the
subutility function; when that concavity is sufficiently high (Di > 1), the diminishing
returns effect dominates the efficiency effect in determining how marginal utility
changes.  Note that, when Di = 1, marginal utility is unchanged.
Combining these two results, we can see that there are two senses in which
an individual might be seen to get “more” out of a good xi than do others.  In the
former case, the contribution to utility of good xi is multiplied by the factor "i.  In the
latter case, there is a sense in which the effective quantity of good xi is multiplied by
the factor $i.  As mentioned in subsection 2.2, one might interpret the former as an
individual enjoying a good more and the latter as an individual being able to use a
good more effectively.  These notions are similar but not the same.
Expression (3.10) indicates that M:/M(i < 0.  A higher (i is thus associated
with higher utility and lower marginal utility, which unambiguously reduces the
marginal social welfare weight WNvc.  As suggested previously, an individual with
a higher (i may be thought of as naturally endowed with more of the good before
purchasing any in the market.  Or, put another way, taking a benchmark value of 0,
a negative (i would indicate a type of disability; the individual needs to purchase
some amount of xi to reach the same starting point as others.  Clearly, an individual
with a lower (i has both lower total utility and higher marginal utility, which
unambiguously implies a higher social welfare weight.
Finally, expression (3.11) displays the obvious result that M:/M*i = 0.  A
higher *i implies a higher utility level but no difference in marginal utility, and thus
a lower social welfare weight WNvc if and only if the SWF is strictly concave.
Indeed, as is apparent from expression (2.4) and as noted previously, the parameter
*i, despite its subscript, is not commodity-specific.  All of the *i’s might be
aggregated into a single parameter * for present purposes.
To summarize, the analysis in this subsection reveals that preference
differences that all imply higher utility levels can nevertheless have qualitatively
different implications for individuals’ marginal utilities of consumption.  Moreover,
marginal utility is directly relevant to the marginal social welfare weight and thus to
determining how preference differences should affect optimal nonlinear income
taxation.  Indeed, with a utilitarian SWF, it is only the effect on marginal utility that
matters.  With strictly concave welfare functions, the utility level matters as well,
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the level of optimal marginal income tax rates because of different possible benchmarks for
comparison.  Ceteris paribus, a higher welfare weight on a marginal dollar does favor lower income
taxation, as discussed in the text.  But, as note 6 mentions, heterogeneity has other effects, including
on labor effort.  Taking, for example, a case in which the marginal utility of consumption is higher,
the analysis in the text indicates that labor effort would also be higher.  Hence, for a given observed
income level wl, the higher l implies a lower w.  Moreover, w is in the denominator of the first-order
condition (2.3) for optimal marginal income tax rates, so the lower w favors higher marginal income
tax rates, the opposite implication of the higher marginal utility.  Accordingly, if labor supply is highly
elastic, the effects on optimal tax rates attributable to marginal utility differences could be offset or
even reversed.
8Realistically, preferences are partially observable, in that preference differences may be
signaled by age, physical disabilities, family status, or other factors.  To an extent, one can interpret
the present analysis as applicable to residual heterogeneity within an identifiable class of individuals,
but one would have to take into account limits on the ability to employ different commodity taxes for
different classes.  Also note that, in addition to limitations due to feasibility and administrative cost,
one can also imagine political constraints, for example, on the use of certain factors such as race that
might correlate with preferences.
9In addition, in the denominator one would have an integral over types of the product gwf.
Regarding w, note that different 2’s may induce individuals of a given w to supply different l’s, so all
those at a given income level wl need not be of the same earning ability w.
and, depending on the type of difference in preference, its strength, and the concavity
of utility and of the SWF, individuals who have preferences that generate greater
utility for a given level of disposable income may receive higher or lower marginal
social welfare weights on their disposable income and thus optimally be subject to
lower or higher levels of income taxation.
7
4.  OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION WITH UNOBSERVABLE TYPES
The analysis in section 3 takes preferences to be observable, whereas here preference
differences are assumed to be entirely unobservable.
8  As a consequence, it is no
longer possible to redistribute across preference types through the income tax.  When
2 is not observed, the income tax schedule T in expression (2.3) must be the same for
all types.  The terms on the right side in this first-order condition accordingly
represent weighted averages of sorts.  Notably, WNvc is the product of the social
welfare weight and marginal utility of consumption, averaged for all types at each
level of earnings, wl.
9
This limitation on across-preference-type redistribution through type-specific
T schedules means that (even with weak labor separability) differential commodity
taxation has a potential role to improve social welfare.  Specifically, if individuals
who have above-average demands for some commodity xi would ideally—that is, if
types were observable—be subject to higher (lower) income taxation, then to some
15
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commodity tax adjustments would favorably affect redistribution.  In addition,
starting from the point of uniform commodity taxation, no first-order loss from
consumption distortion would occur.  The optimal level of commodity taxes and
subsidies would reflect a redistribution-distortion tradeoff, where here the
redistribution is “horizontal” (across preference types) and the distortion is of
commodity demands (rather than of the labor-leisure choice).
To explore which commodities should be taxed or subsidized, it is necessary
first to ascertain the relationship between commodity demands and the preference
parameters.  Once again, it is helpful to refer to Nk, a generic preference parameter
for good k.  Differentiating the commodity demands (3.2) with respect to Nk yields
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Note that the first partial derivative term on the right side holds the marginal utility
of income constant, but that this effect is taken into account in the second term.
Using expression (3.5) for d:/dNk, expression (4.1) can be restated as
(.)
()
. 42 1
1
1
dx
d
x
q
x
wT
dl
d
q
x
k
k
k
k
k
k
i
i
i
n φ
∂
∂φ
∂
∂μ
μ
∂
∂μ
=+
− ′ −
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
= ∑
The denominator of the fractional term in large parentheses on the right side of
expression (4.2) is the same as the denominator on the right side of expression (3.5)
for d:/dNk, and this was previously shown to be positive.  Specifically, the first term
of the denominator is positive and each term in the summation is negative.  From the
latter, it follows that the numerator in the fractional term is negative.  Moreover, this
numerator is equal to the k
th term in the summation in the denominator.  Taken
together, these features imply that the value of the term in large parentheses is in the
interval (0, 1).  Therefore, expression (4.2) indicates that the total derivative dxk/dNk
has the same sign as the partial derivative Mxk/MNk but is smaller in magnitude.  This
result is in accord with intuition: The total effect on demand is given by starting with
the effect when :, the marginal utility of consumption, is taken to be constant and
then dampening it by the resulting adjustment in :.  For example, if the partial
derivative indicates that demand would rise, this rise in demand is financed partly by
16
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regarding the direction and magnitude of optimal adjustments to income taxation when those
adjustments derive from differences in marginal utilities of consumption.
11Observe that any effects of such a subsidy across income levels (for example, with a normal
good, higher-ability individuals who earn higher incomes spend more on the good and thus benefit
more from the subsidy, even if they have the same "i as others) can be offset through the T schedule.
reducing demands for other goods and partly by increasing labor supply, both of
which imply a higher :, and the higher : reduces the magnitude of the increase in
demand, but not to zero.
Because each of the partial derivatives Mxk/MNk was signed in subsection 3.2,
in expressions (3.8) through (3.11), we can now consider how preference
heterogeneity bears on optimal differentiation of commodity taxes.  Suppose initially
that the only heterogeneity involves parameter "i for some good xi.  From
expressions (3.8) and (4.2), it follows that individuals who have a higher "i than do
others have a higher demand for xi, ceteris paribus.  Furthermore, the analysis in
subsection 3.2 indicates that the direction of the ideal redistributive adjustment (i.e.,
the adjustment to T if 2 were observable) depends on the SWF.  The reason is that
a higher "i implies a higher marginal utility vc but also a higher utility level and thus
a lower WN if the SWF is strictly concave.
10  For concreteness, suppose that the SWF
is utilitarian, in which case WN is constant; then only the marginal utility effect is
relevant, so it is unambiguously optimal to redistribute toward high-"i individuals.
Since they have higher demands for xi, some degree of subsidy would be optimal.
11
Note that the use of the term subsidy here refers to a relative subsidy (and likewise
for later uses of the term tax); instead of subsidizing good xi, one could instead
(equivalently) tax all other goods and adjust T accordingly.
As one generalizes to cases involving preference heterogeneity relating to
many commodities, the problem becomes more complex.  For example, suppose that
heterogeneity exists regarding all of the "i’s.  The preceding analysis suggests that
one would like to relatively subsidize all goods, which is impossible—i.e., the effects
of the different subsidies would be offsetting.  Taking a more concrete example,
suppose that some types of individuals have uniformly higher "i’s than do others.
Under the utilitarian SWF, it would be ideal to redistribute income to them; however,
this cannot be done through differential commodity taxation because, in this case,
relative demands would be unaffected.
Combining the preceding points, it appears that it would be optimal to
subsidize goods relatively preferred by types whose overall or average levels of the
"i’s are higher.  To illustrate, assume that individuals with generally higher "i’s have
an "j that is relatively low for them.  The prescription would be to relatively
subsidize all goods except good xj—i.e., to relatively tax good xj, even if these
17
Kaplow: Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 200812The magnitude of the corresponding Di’s would also matter, for Di affects the magnitude of
the utility level and marginal utility effects and also the magnitude of demand effects, including the
demand elasticity, which is related to the distortionary cost being traded off against the redistributive
benefit.
individuals’ "j’s are above the population average (although lower than the average
of their own, other "i’s).
Alternatively, suppose that each of the "i’s is independently distributed.  In
that case, it would seem advantageous under a utilitarian SWF to impose relative
subsidies on the goods with the greatest variance in the distribution of the "i’s,
whereas relative taxes may be optimal if the SWF is sufficiently concave.  The
intuition is that, on average, subsidies would provide a larger benefit to high-"i
individuals, and to a greater degree the higher are their "i’s.  This point is most easily
seen in the limiting case in which the variance for one of the "i’s is large and that for
all of the others approaches zero, which presents the original case with heterogeneity
for only one of the "i’s.
12
Similar analysis applies to the other parameters.  For example, higher (i’s
imply both lower marginal utility (see expression 3.10) and a higher utility level, so
we would ideally like to redistribute away from individuals with atypically high (i’s.
Furthermore, high-(i individuals have lower demands for corresponding goods xi, so
it would be ideal to subsidize goods for which some individuals have unusually high
(i’s.  (With the "i’s, commodity subsidies favor individuals with high values of the
parameter; with the (i’s, subsidies favor individuals with low values.)  But, as with
the "i’s, one cannot relatively subsidize all goods, so one must consider relative
differences in parameter values.
For the parameter *, higher values indicate no difference in marginal utility
(see expression 3.11) but higher total utility and thus a lower WN if the SWF is
strictly concave.  However, because the value of * has no influence on commodity
demands, commodity taxes cannot be employed directly to accomplish any desired
redistribution.
For the parameter $, the situation is more complicated.  From expression
(3.9), the sign of the marginal utility effect—and, accordingly, from expression (4.2),
the sign of the demand effect—depends on the magnitude of the pertinent Di
(abstracting from the further adjustment required when the corresponding (i does not
equal zero).  For example, if heterogeneity concerns a particular $i, and we consider
the case in which Di < 1, then high-$i individuals have higher marginal utilities,
ceteris paribus, and under a utilitarian SWF it would be optimal to redistribute
toward them.  In this case, such individuals also have higher demands, so a
commodity subsidy would be optimal.  If instead Di > 1, then high-$i individuals
have lower marginal utilities, so it would be optimal to redistribute away from them.
In this alternative case, however, such individuals have lower demands, so again a
18
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 40
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/iss1/art4013The existence of little or no demand effect due to differences in $i’s does not, however,
imply that no distortion in commodity demands results from differential taxation.
subsidy (which would favor low-$i, high-demand individuals) would be optimal.  In
both instances, note that the ability to use commodity taxation to redistribute is
limited the closer that Di is to 1; when Di = 1, heterogeneity regarding $i has no effect
on demand for that commodity, so across-preference-type redistribution through
commodity taxes is infeasible (and also would not be optimal with a utilitarian SWF,
although it would be if the SWF was strictly concave).
13
The optimal use of differential commodity taxation actually depends on the
combination of all of the parameters.  As a group, they determine whether it would
be optimal to redistribute toward or away from an individual of a given overall
preference type 2.  Furthermore, as a group they determine the direction of any
differences in demand.  Even for a specified SWF, such as a utilitarian one, the ideal
direction of redistribution sometimes is in the same direction and sometimes is in the
opposite direction of the corresponding demand effect.  Accordingly, broad
generalizations about preference heterogeneity and the signs of optimal deviations
from uniform commodity taxation cannot be offered.
It may be possible, however, to identify some particular effects.  It seems
plausible that some individuals toward whom it would be optimal to redistribute do
systematically demand more of certain commodities.  This might include those with
physical limitations (the goods might be types of medical care or disability
accommodations such as wheelchairs) or mental infirmities (the goods might be
certain drugs or psychiatric care).  To some degree, the analysis of section 3 may be
applicable because some of these differences in preferences correspond to observable
differences, in which case heterogeneity-motivated redistribution should (in the
benchmark case with separable labor) be accomplished entirely through the income
tax.  But some physical and mental infirmities may be more difficult to observe, so
differential commodity taxation may play a useful role.  In this regard, it should be
noted that optimal differential taxation may be appropriate for more than the obvious
goods, such as those already noted.  For example, individuals with more hidden
physical disabilities might engage less in physically strenuous activities (skiing) and
more in gentler activities; those with certain psychological difficulties likewise may
have atypically high demand for some commodities and low demand for others.
What matters, it should be recalled, is various individuals’ relative demands.  Thus,
some impaired individuals might have an unusually low "i for some commodity, but
this parameter value may still be relatively high for them, and it in turn may imply
higher demand, which would favor a subsidy.
19
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heterogeneity (with a constant mean) can raise or lower the sum of marginal benefits, depending on
the preference parameter that varies (and the level of the corresponding Di).
5.  PUBLIC GOODS AND EXTERNALITIES
5.1.  PUBLIC GOODS
To introduce public goods, modify the initial utility function to be u(x, g, l, 2), where
g is a vector of m!n public goods (and m is now the total number of private and
public goods).  Likewise, the specific utility function (2.4) can be amended as
follows:
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As before, for the case in which Di = 1, the fractional expressions are replaced by
ln ($ixi + (i) and ln ($igi + (i) respectively.
Consider first the case in which 2 is observable.  With weak labor
separability, which expression (5.1) exhibits, the proofs in Kaplow (1996, 2006c) on
the optimality of the Samuelson rule for public goods provision—without
adjustments for distribution or labor supply distortion—go through.  The reasoning
is analogous to that in subsection 3.1, as the proofs in Kaplow (1996, 2006c) are in
relevant respects analogous to that in Kaplow (2006a) for uniform commodity
taxation.  Thus, in summing or integrating individuals’ marginal benefits (measured
in dollars) from more of a public good, each individual’s possibly idiosyncratic
valuation would be employed; this total, whatever it may be, is then compared with
the marginal cost of increased provision, just as in the case with homogeneous
preferences.
14
Accordingly, the effect of observable preference heterogeneity regarding
public goods on optimal policy is entirely through the income tax schedules T(wl, 2),
which are customized for each preference type.  These effects, however, are
qualitatively different from those deriving from heterogeneous preferences for
commodities.  The reason is that, although differences in the Nk’s, for k > n (i.e., for
the public goods) affect utility levels analogously (utility is increasing in each of ",
$, (, and *), differences in these Nk’s do not affect individuals’ marginal utilities of
20
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consumption of private goods.  Accordingly, for a utilitarian SWF, the optimal
income tax schedule would not be adjusted, and for a strictly concave SWF, higher
values of these parameters imply higher utility and thus a lower WN, so optimal levels
of income taxation would be higher.
This irrelevance result concerning marginal utilities is due to the separability
between public and private goods embodied in the utility function (5.1).  More
generally, marginal utility effects in either direction are possible.  For example,
better roads may make automobiles more valuable, and one could imagine this
arising in a manner that increased individuals’ marginal utilities of consumption by
a larger amount for individuals who had a stronger preference for driving.  Suppose
further that this greater preference operated through the corresponding "i (perhaps
the "i for driving would be multiplied by "jgj for roads).  Then high-"j individuals
would have a higher “effective” "i, which, ceteris paribus, implies a higher marginal
utility of consumption, so under a utilitarian SWF their optimal level of income
taxation would be lower on this account.
Now consider the case in which 2 is unobservable.  The analysis of the
optimal income tax would be analogous to that described in section 4 on
unobservable heterogeneity in preferences for commodities.  It might appear that
there is no implication corresponding to the nonuniform commodity tax results since
all individuals necessarily receive the same amount of each public good—i.e.,
differences in consumption patterns do not exist and thus may seem to render
differential treatment infeasible.  But this supposition is incorrect.  By providing
more or less of the public good than the amount indicated by the Samuelson rule,
different preference types can be favored and disfavored: Raising (lowering) the
level of the public good provides disproportionate benefits to those with a higher
(lower) marginal utility for that good (assuming distribution-neutral finance of the
sort described in subsection 3.1).
The remaining question is which goods should thus be over- or under-
provided relative to the level that satisfies the Samuelson rule.  Once again, with
preferences separable between public and private goods and a utilitarian SWF, we
have no basis for deviation since heterogeneity in preferences for public goods does
not influence individuals’ marginal utilities of consumption.  If the SWF is strictly
concave or if cross-effects exist, then the previous comments for the case of
observable preferences would become relevant.
15  For example, with a strictly
concave W, if individuals with overall detrimental preference parameters (i.e., those
whose preference parameters generate less utility from public and private goods at
a given income level) tend to derive atypically high marginal utility from public
21
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that individuals who are unusually vulnerable to being mugged also tend to be worse
off in other respects (which cannot readily be observed).  In this case, greater police
protection would have a favorable distributive effect.  By contrast, if national parks
are most enjoyed by more robust individuals, who otherwise tend to be better off on
average, then lower provision would be distributively beneficial.
5.2.  EXTERNALITIES
To examine externalities instead of public goods, one can modify the initial utility
function to be u(x,  e,  l,  2), where e is a vector of m!n externalities.  For
concreteness, one might take m = 2n and suppose that each externality is measured
by the total consumption of the corresponding commodity.  Analogous to expression
(5.1), the specific utility function (2.4) becomes:
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(The modification for the case in which Di = 1 is analogous as well.)  For a negative
externality  ei, the corresponding "i would be negative.  Observe that, in this
formulation, externalities have a public good character:  Each individual is exposed
to the same levels of the ei’s, although different preference types are affected
differently by any particular ei.  Thus, the sum (integral) of marginal external benefits
or harms for purposes of applying the Pigouvian rule of setting commodity taxes and
subsidies equal to marginal harm and benefit, respectively, is directly analogous to
the sum of marginal benefits in the public goods case.
At this point it should be unsurprising that the analysis closely parallels that
for public goods.  When 2 is observable and weak labor separability is assumed, as
in expression (5.2), we can employ the proof method in Kaplow (2006b) to show that
there should be no adjustment to the Pigouvian rule on account of distribution or
labor supply distortion.  (Extensions for partial reforms that are analogous to those
considered for commodity taxation continue to hold here as well.)  Once again,
heterogeneous preferences would only be relevant in setting the income tax
schedules T(wl, 2), and the pertinent adjustments would follow the same sort of
reasoning applicable for public goods.  For example, in expression (5.2) in which
private goods and externalities have separable effects, externalities—and thus
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tax adjustments, differences in preferences for commodities are also relevant to across-preference-type
redistribution, but that is already captured by the analysis in section 4.
17For differing perspectives, see Hare (1981), Sen and Williams (1982), and Kaplow and
Shavell (2002).
differences in preference parameters regarding externalities—affect utility levels but
not the marginal utility of consumption, so heterogeneous preferences regarding
externalities would only be relevant to optimal income taxation to the extent that the
SWF is strictly concave.  Relaxing this separability assumption would allow for
interactions.
When  2 is not observable, it may be optimal to depart from the pure
Pigouvian rule.  Although individuals all experience the same levels of the
externalities, different types of individuals can be favored or disfavored by regulating
externalities more or less than indicated by the Pigouvian rule.
16  For example, if
some pollutant imposes greater marginal harm on more infirm individuals who also
tend to be worse off in other (unobservable) respects, greater control of that pollutant
would tend to be optimal under a strictly concave SWF.  Likewise, just as it may
have been optimal to reduce expenditures on national parks that disproportionately
benefit more robust individuals who are otherwise better off on average, so it may
be optimal to reduce (relative to the Pigouvian optimum) the control of pollution that
primarily interferes with the enjoyment of wilderness areas.
6.  WELFARE ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Analysis of optimal taxation, public goods provision, and the control of externalities,
like most policy analysis conducted by economists, is grounded in the welfare
economic tradition, which is controversial.  Taking the SWF to be linear—that is,
utilitarian—further adds to the dispute.
17  Certain issues that have been central in
these normative debates are brought to the fore when heterogeneous preferences are
introduced.
Problems of interpersonal comparisons of utility are often circumvented by
treating all individuals as if they are identical.  But when heterogeneity involves
aspects of utility that give rise to different demands, this approach is no longer
available, even if it could otherwise be defended.  Furthermore, the formal meaning
of ignoring differences is ambiguous and incomplete because the outcome depends
on what preferences are deemed normal; moreover, when taste differences are
associated with, say, disabilities, many would find the case for recognizing rather
than ignoring differences to be particularly compelling.  Of course, many taste
differences can neither be observed nor well estimated, making it difficult for
policies to reflect them.  But when differences are observed or the nature of
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determine allocations, respectively, based on conceptions of primary goods or functionings and
capabilities, rather than based on individuals’ utilities, even if they could reliably be determined.  But
as Kaplow (2007) shows, these approaches conflict with the Pareto principle (as do deviations from
welfarism more generally, on which see Kaplow and Shavell, 2001).
19A utilitarian SWF requires a degree of interpersonal comparison that is referred to in the
social choice literature as cardinal unit comparability.  Note that von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
functions are cardinal, due to rationality axioms; unit comparability further requires the ability to relate
the cardinal units of one person’s utility to those of another’s.  A strictly concave SWF also requires
level comparability, which together with cardinal unit comparability amounts to cardinal full
comparability.  For further discussion, see Sen (1977).  A maximin SWF only requires level
comparability because only the utility of the least-well-off individual matters; however, Ng (1984a)
has shown that, when combined with the axioms of individual rationality, this seemingly lesser
assumption implies unit and thus full comparability in any event.
underlying heterogeneity can be determined to some extent, optimality does in
principle require taking such differences into account.
18
If preference differences are granted, the necessary interpersonal comparisons
raise issues of cardinalization, which has been noted, for example, by Boadway et
al. (2002) and Sandmo (1993).  For example, if individuals are observed to have a
certain disability, say blindness, it is necessary to determine how much this affects
their utility level (if the SWF is strictly concave) and their marginal utility of
consumption.
19  In order for a social response to be based on how the disability
actually affects individuals (rather than on some criteria that is independent of well-
being), such questions must somehow be answered, at least approximately.
Finally, unlike in most analyses (other than of the optimal income tax itself),
the degree of concavity of the SWF must be specified.  Indeed, to set commodity
taxes, which optimally involve differentials in the case in which preference
differences are unobservable, even the signs of the optimal deviations from
uniformity depend on the curvature of the SWF.  Although notable economists, like
Harsanyi (1953, 1955), and others, such as Rawls (1971), have famously staked out
positions on this question, debate has hardly subsided.
Some have reacted to prior drafts and presentations of this paper by
suggesting that explicit analysis of optimal policy with heterogeneity bolsters the
case against utilitarianism and perhaps welfare economics more broadly.  I disagree.
Having presented my views on these and related questions at length in Kaplow and
Shavell (2002) and Kaplow (2008, chapters 13-15), I offer no further elaboration
here.  What does seem apparent, however, is that analysis of heterogeneity—whether
in the setting of physical and mental disabilities or otherwise—does prompt
reflection on these fundamental normative questions.
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Heterogeneous preferences undoubtedly exist and in some instances may be
important.  Accordingly, it is useful to revisit optimal policy rules that have been
derived in models in which preferences are taken to be homogeneous.  The results
depend greatly on whether preference differences are observable and on the nature
of those differences.
With observability, a number of first-best policy prescriptions in benchmark
cases (notably, with weak labor separability) continue to hold.  This conclusion is
true of the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) rule favoring uniform commodity taxation as
well as generalizations that do not require the income tax to be optimal and that
encompass partial reforms, such as proportional moves toward uniformity.  Likewise,
results regarding the Pareto optimality of moving public goods provision in the
direction indicated by the Samuelson rule and Pigouvian taxes and subsidies toward
full internalization of externalities—without regard to concerns for distribution and
labor supply distortion—also extend to the present setting.
The characterization of optimal nonlinear income taxation, however, changes
in important ways.  Groups with preference parameters indicating higher utility
levels are, ceteris paribus, optimally subject to higher levels of income
taxation—some combination of higher marginal tax rates and a lower grant—to the
extent that the SWF is strictly concave.  But different sorts of preference parameters
have different effects on individuals’ marginal utilities of consumption and thus
parameters producing higher utility levels may favor higher or lower income
taxation.
When differences in preferences are unobservable, a single income tax
schedule must be applied to everyone, and optimal marginal income tax rates are
determined similarly to the manner applicable with homogeneous preferences.
(Roughly, weighted averages substitute for specific values, but the basic formula is
the same.)  In this case, it is the more specific policy rules that may differ
qualitatively from what arises with homogeneous preferences.  Differential
commodity taxation, public goods provision that deviates from the levels implied by
the Samuelson rule, and corrective taxes that over- or under-internalize externalities
are optimal to some degree in cases in which such deviations can indirectly
accomplish some of the across-preference-type redistribution that would have been
implemented through differentiated income tax schedules if preference differences
were observable.  Examples were offered that involve some possible manifestations
of physical and mental disabilities.
Overall, departures from results in models with homogeneous preferences
depend on a variety of factors.  Different ways in which preferences might vary have
qualitatively different effects, even in opposite directions.  Furthermore, preference
differences interact with each other and with the various policy instruments in
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heterogeneous.
Accordingly, conjectures and results in existing literature on heterogeneity
need to be interpreted as special cases in ways that have not previously been
recognized; indeed, a change in specifications of preference differences can reverse
results.  Nevertheless, some plausible conjectures can be offered when it is possible
to ascertain the character of preference differences, even if they cannot be observed
for each individual.  These findings may have direct policy relevance, and they
indicate the value of empirical research on preference heterogeneity.
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